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Corporate governance and the informativeness of disclosures in Australia:
A re-examination 
ABSTRACT  
We re-examine the association between corporate governance and disclosures reported by 
Beekes and Brown (2006), using an extended time series of Australian data. Since the ASX 
corporate governance guidelines were introduced in 2003, firms generally have increased 
their disclosure frequency and demonstrated an improvement in the timeliness of bad news 
relative to good news, indicating a levelling of disclosure practices and greater transparency. 
Better governed firms have become more cautious in their disclosure practices. However they 
continue to be more balanced with respect to good and bad news timeliness. Changes to 




Formal disclosures are an important medium through which firms signal private information 
to the market. Greater disclosure has the potential to reduce a firm’s cost of capital (Botosan, 
1997) and can limit costly litigation for inadequate disclosure of impending bad news 
(Skinner, 1994). Corporate governance (CG) policies are believed to influence the level of 
disclosure and the firm’s transparency. Although higher CG quality1 could substitute for 
greater disclosure (firms that adopt stronger governance measures make fewer disclosures), it 
could be complementary (controlling shareholders may find it advantageous if the firm 
adopts weaker governance measures and is less transparent). Evidence on whether CG and 
disclosure are complements or substitutes is mixed. Eng and Mak (2003) find less disclosure 
by firms with greater outside director board membership (typically an indicator of stronger 
governance) in Singapore, but Bassett, Koh and Tutticci (2007), Lim, Matolcsy and Chow 
(2007) and Beekes and Brown (2006) find a complementary association for Australian firms.  
Our knowledge of relationships between CG and disclosure is still limited, particularly with 
respect to how changes in CG guidelines and in the law affect the firm’s public disclosures 
and its market transparency. To investigate these two aspects further, we study Australian 
firms over the period 2001–2008. We study CG in Australia as there has been a Continuous 
Disclosure (CD) statutory requirement since 1994, and excellent data are available on the 
content of all announcements made by listed companies to the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX) and precisely when the ASX released them to the market.2 Legal cases brought by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and other enforcement actions by 

1 We take higher quality CG to mean 'better' CG, which is shorthand for a greater degree of compliance with an 
authoritative set of CG principles or guidelines. In this study, by stating ‘better’ CG we are referring to the firm 
being scored more highly according to the Horwath CG ratings for Australian firms (see below). 
2 “Continuous disclosure is the timely advising of information to keep the market informed of events and 
developments as they occur. Information for release to the market must be given to ASX’s company 
announcements office” for release to the market before it is released publicly (ASX, 2012, p.301; see also 
Brown, Taylor and Walter, 1999; Brown, Howitt and Wee, 2005; Matolcsy, Tyler and Wells, 2012). Continuous 
disclosure is a statutory requirement monitored and enforced jointly by the ASX and the Commonwealth 
government regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 
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ASIC indicate compliance with CD is less than complete and that the role of CG in 
determining firms’ disclosure practices remains an issue.3 The relevance of our sample period 
is highlighted by two events: the introduction in 2003 of the ASX’s ‘Principles of Good 
Governance and Best Practice Recommendations’, hereafter the ASX CG Code; and 
provisions in the 2004 Commonwealth Corporate Reporting and Disclosure Laws (CLERP 
9). Another reason for choosing Australia is that our findings should apply in other countries 
with established equity markets and a comparable CG code, such as Canada and the UK. 
We contribute to the literature on CG and disclosure in several ways. First, by reverting to 
methods pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969) and introduced to the accounting 
literature by Ball and Brown (1968), we provide stark evidence that differences in CG ratings 
are related to the average speed of longer-term price discovery (“timeliness”, in Ball and 
Brown’s terminology). Second, building on foundations laid by Beekes and Brown (2006), 
hereafter BB06, we employ a battery of multivariate tests that collectively provide evidence 
that CG and disclosures by Australian firms are linked but that the link has attenuated over 
time. Although the BB06 results have been widely cited,4 they were limited to one year of 
CG data and their applicability to a longer time frame has not been demonstrated. As Brown 
(2013a) comments, replicating such studies is justified if it clarifies their external validity.
Given the intervening years since the BB06 study was undertaken and the methodological, 
institutional and legislative changes that have taken place, we improve substantially on BB06 
by extending the study period to eight years of governance data (2001-2008), by refining the 
dependent variables, by re-specifying their models, and by adopting better estimators. In the 
process, we address Clubb’s (2006) comments on endogeneity and the need to examine 
timeliness of price discovery in both good and bad news periods. Our third contribution is to 

3 For example, James Hardie Industries, Fortescue Metals and Centro (ASIC, 2011a, 2011b, 2012).
4 According to Harzing’s Publish or Perish software (available from http://www.harzing.com/pop.htm), BB06 
had been cited 192 times by mid-May 2014. 
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show that, while the transparency and the timeliness of disclosures do differ significantly 
across firms according to their governance practices, inasmuch as there appear to be intra-
year changes in behaviour, the relationship between CG and market transparency may be 
more subtle than previously thought. Fourth, we contribute directly to the regulatory debate 
on the importance of CG for firms’ disclosure policies and their transparency in equity 
markets by re-affirming the practitioner view, as reflected in the ASX CG Code, that better 
governed firms are more forthcoming and more balanced in their disclosures. 
In sum, we find firms with better CG are priced more efficiently (i.e., news is priced earlier) 
in equity markets than poorly governed firms, although good news is priced earlier for poorly 
governed firms. Correspondingly, bad news is priced more efficiently for better governed 
firms. The ASX CG Code of 2003 appears to have levelled disclosure practices across firms, 
with greater document disclosure and more balanced share market pricing of good relative to 
bad news. Despite the levelling, better governed firms can still signal their quality by being 
more conservative with respect to good news timeliness. Additional sanctions placed upon 
firms and individuals by CLERP 9 may have made firms more cautious when disclosing 
information, with fewer price sensitive disclosures and less timely pricing of good and bad 
news.
The remainder of our paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data, and is followed by a description, in 
Section 4, of our research methods. Section 5 contains the results and summarises their 





While Australian firms are legally required to release price sensitive information to the 
market on a timely basis, even without a legal requirement they would have an incentive to 
disclose information to signal their quality and avoid Akerlof’s (1970) ‘lemons’ problem. 
Disclosure can be valuable to the firm as it may reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997). It 
can also be important when seeking the attention of potential investors. For example, Collett 
and Hrasky (2005) find more comprehensive disclosures of CG practices in company annual 
reports for firms raising additional share capital, prior to a requirement to do so.  
However, complete (full) disclosure is unlikely to be optimal (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012) 
and firms may decide to retain some private information within the firm, possibly due to their 
close ownership structures or for fear of losing a competitive advantage. Reputedly U.S. 
managers delay the disclosure of bad news relative to good news (Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 
2009), despite the risk of costly litigation if bad news is withheld (Skinner, 1994). There may 
be a loss of reputational capital if managers become known for early disclosures of less 
precise or unconfirmed good news, or for withholding bad news from the market until either 
all reasonable avenues for reversing the bad news are exhausted or an impending mandatory 
reporting deadline leaves them with little choice.5 Given this background, we focus on 
whether CG has a bearing on firms’ disclosure policies and their outcomes. 
2.2. Disclosure frequency and corporate governance 
Although additional disclosures may be a substitute for better CG structures, prior research 
on Australian companies indicates CG quality and disclosures are complementary even when 
disclosures are mandatory (Kent and Stewart, 2008; Nelson, Gallery and Percy, 2010).6
Given BB06 found better CG in Australian firms was associated with greater frequency of 

5 Gong (2007) and Kothari et al. (2009) summarise various motives for this behaviour by managers. 
6 Lim et al. (2007, p.578) claim the association between a core component of CG and disclosures holds only for 
certain types of disclosure. They find board independence is influential only on “forward looking and 
quantitative information” and there is no relationship for “non-financial and financial voluntary disclosure” in 
Australian firms’ 2001 annual reports.
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disclosure to the ASX, we likewise predict better governed Australian firms lodge more 
documents with the ASX.  
H1: Firms with better CG lodge more documents with the ASX. 
2.3. Timeliness of price discovery and corporate governance 
Timeliness is an important characteristic for information to be useful to an investor’s decision 
making process. The timeliness of price discovery refers to how quickly market sensitive 
information is incorporated into the firm’s share price and is a measure of transparency 
(BB06). The ASX’s alert system monitors price and volume changes and the ASX will query 
a firm if a significant price change or increase in volume traded has no apparent explanation. 
A substantial share price 'penalty' can be imposed by the market on a firm when the market 
learns the ASX has queried the firm about an unexplained price increase and the firm offers 
no explanation in its response.7 Thus firms have an incentive to monitor price movements and 
a statutory obligation to ensure price sensitive news is disclosed appropriately before it leaks 
to the market. If the directors of better governed firms are more diligent in monitoring market 
behaviour and meeting their statutory obligations, they will release information in a more 
timely fashion and we would expect their information to be reflected in share prices on a 
more timely basis (i.e. more quickly). Consistent with this view, BB06 find evidence of 
timelier price discovery for better governed Australian firms. Thus we likewise predict:  
H2: Price discovery is more timely (faster) for firms with better CG. 
2.4. Timeliness of good and bad news, and corporate governance 
Better governed Australian firms generally take a more conservative approach to income 
recognition (Ahmed and Henry, 2012). If their conservatism extends to news recognition, 
then the market pricing of good news for firms with better CG would be decelerated; i.e., it 

7 Based on data from July 1998-June 2000 and January 2010-April 2012, around 90% of queries have been due 
to unexplained price increases (Gong, 2007; Drienko and Sault, 2013). 
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would be reflected in their stock prices later than would be the case for poorly governed 
firms. With regard to bad news, better governed firms will ‘get bad news out’ earlier than 
poorly governed firms. This behaviour is consistent with the ASX CG Code proposition that 
better governed firms are more balanced in their disclosures of good and bad news (see 
below, section 2.6) and it supports the following three predictions: 
H3: The timeliness of good news is slower for firms with better CG than for firms with 
weaker CG. 
H4: The timeliness of bad news is faster for firms with better CG than for firms with 
weaker CG. 
H5: For firms with weaker CG, the timeliness of good news is faster than bad news. 
2.5. Timeliness of document releases and corporate governance 
As noted earlier, the timing and nature of company announcements remain subject to 
significant discretion on the part of management. There is already evidence that firms with 
more independent boards are less likely to engage in earnings management or fraud (Beasley, 
1996) and may improve the timeliness of price discovery (BB06). Consistent with prior 
research, we expect closer monitoring provided by a board that is more independent (which 
will be reflected in a higher overall CG rating) results in more timely lodgement of 
documents with the ASX:  
H6: Firms with better CG lodge their documents with the ASX on a more timely basis.
2.6 Changes to regulation
The ASX CG Code was first published in 2003 and contained 10 key principles of good CG. 
Importantly, the code refers to timely and balanced disclosure (Principle 5), proposing “all 
investors have equal and timely access to material information concerning the company” and 
“company announcements are factual and presented in a clear and balanced way. ‘Balance’ 
8
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requires the disclosure of both positive and negative information” (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2003, p. 35). Acknowledging that a ‘one size fits all approach’ is 
inappropriate, beginning in 2003 firms listed on the ASX have been required to either 
disclose that they complied with the 10 CG principles or explain where their practices 
departed from them (Hamilton, 2004).8 Given this focus, we would expect to find stronger 
evidence supporting H1–H6 since the Code was promulgated in 2003.  
CLERP 9 took effect from 1 July 2004. Its CG provisions included requiring formal 
statements on the integrity of the financial statements by the CEO and CFO and, while the 
provision of non-audit services by external auditors was not prohibited, if those services were 
provided then the reasons why the auditor’s independence is unaffected should be disclosed. 
Penalties for non-compliance with the CD regime were raised: individuals involved in a 
firm’s failure to disclose material information became personally liable, firms became subject 
to an increase from AUD200,000 to AUD1,000,000 in the maximum penalty for a breach of 
the CD provisions, and the enforcement powers of ASIC with respect to such matters were 
enhanced. These provisions may also have resulted in stronger support for H1–H6. 
3. Data
Our primary sample, of 1,994 firm-years, comprises data for Australian listed companies with 
CG ratings in the Horwath reports published annually from 2002 to 2009.9 Financial and 
Industrial Sector data were collected from a variety of sources, as explained below, and 
matched to this primary sample to yield a final sample of 1,487 firm-years. 
3.1. Measuring corporate governance 

8 There is a specific requirement for firms included in the S&P/ASX All Ordinaries Index to have an audit 
committee, under listing rule 12.7 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003). Some relatively minor changes 
to CG guidance were made in 2007 when an updated CG code was issued by the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, to apply to financial years after 1 January 2008 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007). 
9 The CG reports we use initially were published by Horwath (2002-2006) and subsequently by WHK Horwath 
(2007-2009). The ratings were compiled at the University of Newcastle, Australia.  
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We use the ratings in the Horwath reports to measure CG. The reports aim “to provide 
concrete evidence on Australian CG practice by focusing on objective, publicly available and 
measurable aspects of good governance” (WHK Horwath, 2008: p. 6). The ratings reflect 
information in the firm’s annual report for the previous financial year. Prior work has used 
specific components of CG (e.g. the proportion of non-executive directors) to indicate better 
CG, whereas the Horwath measure has the twin advantages of being more comprehensive and 
collected on a consistent basis. The reports are confined to Australian companies and have 
greater coverage than other databases such as Risk Metrics.  
Each Horwath report contains CG rankings and ‘star’ ratings (ranging from a single star up to 
5 stars) for the top 250 Australian listed companies by market capitalisation on 30 June of the 
previous year.10 Rankings reflect the degree of independence (i.e. the level of independent 
non-executive director membership) of the board and its main committees (Audit, 
Remuneration and Nomination), among other things. Particular regard is paid to aspects that 
have been identified as important in CG best practice codes in Australia and internationally 
(ASX CG Code 2003 and 2007; USA Blue Ribbon Committee Report, 1999; the OECD 
Report, 2001; The UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010).  
Companies are ranked annually from 1 to 250, where 1 is the best ranked firm, according to 
their overall CG standing relative to other companies reported on that year. To convert the 
Horwath rank to one that is increasing in CG, we reverse the ranking given in the original 
report, adjust for ties, and transform the reversed rankings to range between 0 and 100, where 
100 denotes the ‘best’ CG, as in BB06. In preliminary analysis and in sensitivity tests we also 
measure CG by the number of stars awarded in the Horwath report. The star rating system 
awards 5 stars for “outstanding” CG structures, 4.5 stars when CG was excellent “except in a 
few minor areas”, 4 stars when CG structures were “very good” and the firm “met the 

10The 2003 issue excluded six firms due to missing data.
10

majority of best practice standards”, 3.5 stars when CG structures were “generally good” and 
the firm met “most of best practice standards”, 3 stars when CG structures were “adequate” 
and met “some of best practice standards”, 2 stars when CG structures were “lacking in some 
key areas” and 1 star for very poor CG (WHK Horwath, 2008, p. 33).  
The full details of the Horwath rating system are proprietary and we are unable to comment 
on the assignment of stars or rankings beyond the information provided in the reports 
themselves. We note that our reverse ranking procedure is re-based each year, making it less 
susceptible to secular change, whereas the star ranking is not re-based (i.e. it is an absolute 
measure) and demonstrates an improvement in CG practices over our study period. 
3.2. Other data sources 
To maximise sample coverage, we use the Aspect Financial Database of Australian listed 
companies’ financial statement data, which are ‘as reported’. We extract data for total assets, 
long-term debt, industrial sector and the date of the announcement of the company’s annual 
results from this source. Other sources we consulted, to determine more accurately the date 
on which a company’s Preliminary Final Statement/Report (PFS) was first announced to the 
market, include the ASX, Bloomberg, Compustat Global, Institutional Brokers’ Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S), Reuters and Worldscope. Where there is a conflict in the dates from these 
seven sources, we use the earliest plausible date.11 Data for the number of documents lodged 
with the ASX and their release dates are sourced from the ASX via the Securities Industry 
Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). We use all documents released to the ASX as our 
measure of the frequency of disclosure, but also include measures confined to disclosures 
classified by the ASX as ex ante price sensitive.12 Daily share prices and returns are sourced 

11 We require the release date to be greater than 14 days but less than 180 days from the financial year end date 
to help ensure data integrity. 
12 Examples of disclosures by companies to the ASX are information regarding takeovers, security holdings, 
periodic reports, quarterly earnings or cash flow reports, capital changes, asset acquisitions or disposals and 
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from SIRCA’s Daily Database. We use the Australian All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index to 
measure the return on the whole market. We match the financial data to the CG ratings in the 
following year’s Horwath report (i.e. 2001 calendar year financial data are matched to CG 
ratings in the 2002 Horwath report). Merging the data collected from the various sources 
yields a final dataset of 1,487 observations on 417 unique firms with financial years ending in 
2001 to 2008.13
4. Research Method 
4.1. Abnormal Performance Indexes (APIs) 
Firms that underperformed the market over the 365 day period are classified as ‘Bad News’ 
firms for that year, while those that equalled or outperformed the market are ‘Good News’ 
firms. Since our calculations are mostly based on continuously compounded (log) returns, 
when pooling Good and Bad news cases the cumulative market-adjusted price relative 
(ܥݑ݉݌ݎ݈݁) for a Bad News case was transformed (into ܥݑ݉݌ݎ̴݈݆݁ܽ݀) as follows: 
ܥݑ݉݌ݎ̴݈݆݁ܽ݀ ൌ ሺെ ሺܥݑ݉݌ݎ݈݁ሻሻ, where  denotes the exponential function and 
the natural log function. In terms of CG, we designate firms with a 1 star (ܰ ൌ ͸Ͷfirm-years) 
or 2 star (ܰ ൌ ʹͷͺ) CG rating as ‘Worst CG’ as these firms are lacking CG in key areas or 
had very poor CG under the Horwath rating scheme. Firms with a 5 star rating are designated 
as ‘Best CG’ (ܰ ൌ ͳ͸ͺfirm-years). In the spirit of Ball and Brown (1968), six ‘portfolios’ 
are then constructed: (Best/Worst CG) x (Good/Bad/All News). All stocks in a category of 
interest (e.g., cases of Bad news where the firm was also rated in 2008 among those with the 
best CG) were then included in 2008 in the ‘portfolio’ for that category. 

dividend announcements. Whether a particular disclosure is ex ante deemed price sensitive is determined by the 
ASX prior to the document’s release to the market. For a detailed discussion of the ASX’s announcement 
process see Brown et al. (2005; reproduced in Brown, 2013b).  




Daily averages for each portfolio are calculated by dividing the sum of the members’ 
cumulative market-adjusted price relatives on that day by the number of cases in the 
portfolio; the time-series of the portfolio daily averages is then re-scaled to an initial value of 
zero at the end of day -365 and a terminal value of 1 at the end of day zero. We adopt the Ball 
and Brown (1968) methodology to plot the APIs and examine the plots to determine the 
timeliness of good versus bad news across CG partitions. 14
4.2. Multivariate relationships
4.2.1. BB06 replication 
Initially we replicate the document count and timeliness of price discovery models in BB06, 
as in Eq. (1), which is estimated using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods: 
ܦ݁݌ܸܽݎ௜௧ ൌ E଴ ൅Eଵܥܩ௜௧ ൅Eଶܩ݋݋݀݊݁ݓݏ௜௧ ൅ Eଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ Eସܴ݁݌݋ݎݐ௜௧ ൅ ߣ௧  (1) 
where DepVar is a measure of document count or timeliness of price discovery (detailed 
below), CG is a measure of CG as described in section 3.1, Goodnews is an indicator variable 
which takes the value of one when the firm’s share price outperforms the market over the 
year and zero otherwise, Size is measured by the natural log of market capitalisation at the 
end of the financial year, Report is an indicator variable which takes the value of one when 
the firm was required to lodge a Quarterly Report with the ASX during the year,15 and ߣ is a 
vector of indicator variables that identify the particular year. 

14 Since the ratings relate to financial years ending the year before (i.e., 2001 to 2008), abnormal performance 
indexes (APIs) were calculated over the same 365 days as the timeliness of prices is measured for financial 
years ending in 2001 to 2008. For example, for a company included in the 2008 Horwath report that ended its 
2007 financial year on 30 June and on Wednesday 15 August 2007 filed with the ASX a PFS containing its 
2007 results, the market-adjusted, buy-and-hold API would be calculated from the daily returns over 365 
calendar days ending 29 August 2007, which is the announcement date plus 14 days to allow price to settle. See 
below for further explanation; also Ball and Brown (2014). 
15During our sample period the ASX adopted the GICS classification scheme, which does not map exactly into 
the ASX industry groupings available to BB06. 
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To obtain the document count measures, we count the number of disclosure documents 
released by the firm at any time over 365 days ending with the day of the PFS, denoted day 0 
in the documents analysis.16 Each document released by the firm is counted, irrespective of 
whether another document was also released that day. The dependent variable is the log of 
the document count (either the total of all documents, or only those that are classified by the 
ASX as ex ante price sensitive). 
To measure the timeliness of price discovery, we adapt the BB06 metric to calendar time. 
BB06 used 250 trading days, which is about a year in calendar time. We adopt a 365-day 
calendar year and calculate the measure in calendar time to accommodate future international 
comparisons. The price series is forward-filled (price is brought forward from the previous 
day if the stock is not traded that day). This metric traces the share price over 365 calendar 
days ending 14 days after the firm’s annual PFS announcement, which is the primary 
statement of the year’s financial results. Specifically: 
݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏሺܲݎ݅ܿ݁ݏሻ ൌ ሺሺσ ȁ ሺ ଴ܲሻ െ ሺ ௧ܲሻȁ௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ ሻ െ ͲǤͷሻȀ͵͸ͷ                    (2) 
where tP  is the daily market-adjusted share price and the constant -0.5/365 is an adjustment to 
recognise the flow of information is reflected in returns over the day.17
The timeliness measure captures the speed of information discovery in a firm’s share price 
(i.e. the level of market transparency regarding the firm’s activities) and makes no 
assumption about the mechanism of price discovery.Specifically, it measures how quickly 
the share price reaches the day 0 price (the terminal value in the time series). If a firm 
releases value-relevant information on a more timely basis and in turn the information is 

16 We use the annual PFS release date as day 0 in the analysis of documents because we know the precise date. 
When analysing prices we re-define day 0 as the release date +14 days to allow them to “settle”. BB06 used 10 
trading days after the firm’s annual PFS announcement, which is comparable to 14 calendar days in our study.  
17 If daily log returns were i.i.d. (independently and identically distributed), Timeliness would have an expected 
value of 0.5. 
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incorporated into share price quickly, then the metric will have a value closer to zero; i.e. 
timeliness of price discovery takes a smaller value when information is integrated more 
quickly. We also use a calendar year version of BB06’s Timeliness Deflated measure, which 
adjusts for the magnitude of the drift in price. This measure is calculated by deflating the raw 
timeliness measure in Eq. (2) by one plus the absolute value of the market-adjusted rate of 
return on the share over the period used to calculate timeliness. 
Eq. (1) includes a control for good news because firms with superior performance have been 
found to release more documents (Lev and Penman, 1990). In addition, as already noted they 
may prefer to release this information in a timelier fashion. We control for larger firms as 
they are subject to greater scrutiny, and have stronger incentives to keep analysts and 
institutional investors informed, thereby reducing information asymmetry and possibly 
mitigating political costs (Dye, 2001; Lang and Lundholm, 1993). Thus we expect firm size 
to be positively associated with disclosure frequency and the timeliness of prices to be faster 
for larger firms (Beekes and Brown, 2006, 2007).  
4.2.2. Building on BB06 
We build on the model in Eq. (1) by introducing new dependent variables, by including 
explanatory variables designed to capture the effect of the ASX CG Code and legislative 
changes referred to in section 2.6, and by adding control variables for leverage, industry and 
year, as in Eq. (3): 
ܦ݁݌ܸܽݎ௜௧ ൌ E଴ ൅ Eଵܥܩ௜௧ ൅ Eଶܩ݋݋݀݊݁ݓݏ௜௧ ൅ Eଷܵ݅ݖ݁௜௧ ൅ Eସܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜௧
൅Eହܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜௧ ൅ E଺ܣܵ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ E଻ܣܵܺ ή ܥܩ௜௧ ൅ E଼ܥܮܧܴ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ Eଽܥܮܧܴܲ ή ܥܩ௜௧
൅ߜ௜௧ ൅ ߣ௧        (3) 
where DepVar is the document and timeliness dependent variables (the new variables are 
detailed below); Volatility is measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns over 
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the 90 days before the start of the estimation period; Leverage is measured by the firm’s 
financial year-end ratio of long-term debt to total assets; ASX is an indicator variable equal to 
one for years following the introduction of the ASX CG Code (i.e. years 2003-2008) and 0 
otherwise; CLERP is an indicator variable equal to one for years following the enactment of 
CLERP 9 (i.e. years 2005-2008); and ߜ is a vector of industry indicator variables. Other 
variables are previously defined. For the timeliness of prices models we include an 
interaction term between Goodnews and CG to capture differential timeliness according to 
the favourability of the news. 
The interpretation of the coefficients of interest in Eq. (3) is as follows. Eଵ is the effect of 
better CG on the dependent variable before the ASX CG Code was introduced (for the 
purpose of the present discussion, a better governed firm is one with a CG rank that is one 
standard deviation above the mean). E଺ is the marginal effect of the code for a firm with 
average CG, while E଻ is the additional effect for a firm with better CG. E଼ and Eଽ are the 
corresponding estimates for CLERP 9. Hence the combined effect of both the Code and 
CLERP 9 on a firm with better CG is E଺ ൅ E଻ ൅ E଼ ൅ Eଽ while their effect on one with 
average CG is E଺ ൅ E଼.
BB06’s two document count variables pay no regard to the timing of the documents’ release, 
while the two BB06 timeliness of prices variables suffer from volatility-induced bias, by 
construction. We address these deficiencies by adding two dependent variables that reflect 
the timeliness of document disclosures and three timeliness of prices metrics that are 
adaptations of metrics discussed in Beekes and Brown (2007), namely the timeliness of good, 
of bad, and of all news. 
To measure the timeliness of all documents, the number of documents released each day is 
cumulated in a daily time series and the timeliness metric is calculated as in Eq. (4). The 
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procedure is repeated for price sensitive documents. Smaller values are associated with 
earlier (more timely) announcements to the share market.
݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏሺܦ݋ܿݏሻ ൌ ሺσ ሺܥܦ଴ െ ܥܦ௧௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ ሻȀܥܦ଴ െ ͲǤͷሻȀ͵͸ͷ                                      (4) 
Constructing the three additional metrics for the timeliness of prices is more complicated. To 
measure the timeliness of good news, we first identify the third quartile of the stock’s raw 
(unadjusted) daily log returns, ݎ௧, that are positive; call the third quartile value ܳଷ. We then 
create a market-adjusted daily log return series, (ݎ௧כǡ ݐ ൌ ݏǡǥ ǡ Ͳሻ, where ݏ is the starting day 
of the series (when timeliness is calculated from returns, ݏ ൌ െ͵͸Ͷfor the annual timeliness 
measure and ends on day ݐ ൌ Ͳ, as described earlier). Next we construct a time series of 
cumulative good news returns, ܥ௧ீ ǡby setting ܥିଷ଺ହீ ൌ Ͳ and cumulating the daily market-
adjusted log return series ܥ௧ீ ൌ ܥ௧ିଵீ ൅ ݎ௧ீ  from day -364 to day 0, where ݎ௧ீ ൌ ݎ௧כ  if ݎ௧ ൐ ܳଷǢ
otherwise ݎ௧ீ ൌ Ͳ. The timeliness of good news is then calculated as in Eq. (5), which 
corresponds to Eq. (2) and Eq. (4):
݈ܶ݅݉݁݅݊݁ݏݏሺܩ݋݋݀ܰ݁ݓݏሻ ൌ ሺσ ሺܥ଴ீ െ ܥ௧ீ ሻȀܥ଴ீ െ ͲǤͷሻȀ͵͸ͷ௧ୀିଵ௧ୀିଷ଺ହ     (5) 
The raw (unadjusted) returns are filtered at the third quartile to mitigate undue noise. The 
ASX trades securities about 250 days of the year, so roughly a third of the prices are forward-
filled before we take non-trading into account. To suppress noise from bid-ask bounce and 
the like, we chose the third quartile as the filter, based on inspection of the empirical 
distributions of log returns for firm-years in the sample. The equivalent procedure is adopted 
for bad news. The all news measure is the weighted sum of the good and bad news measures, 
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where the weights sum to one and are ሺܥ଴ீ Ȁሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻand ሺܥ଴஻Ȁሾܥ଴ீ ൅ ܥ଴஻ሿሻ respectively and 
ܥ௧ீ  and ܥ௧஻ are the unsigned good and bad news cumulative values at the end of day 0.18
Our models include controls for leverage and volatility, which could impact on the level of 
firm disclosure. Leverage proxies for the degree of risk associated with default on debt. 
Creditors and lenders can request additional information on a timelier basis to monitor their 
investment more closely as leverage rises. Also, firms that are more highly levered may 
release more information to shareholders, who face greater risk (Taylor, Richardson, Tower 
and Hancock, 2012). Thus more highly levered firms may release more documents, be more 
timely in their releases, and be subject to more efficient stock price discovery. Similarly, a 
firm with greater volatility in performance may release additional information, although as 
BB06 point out their measures of the timeliness of price discovery can be detrimentally 
affected by a more volatile stock price. Our regression analysis controls for industry and, in 
sensitivity analysis, we assess the robustness of the results to the exclusion of three industry 
sectors that may have incentives to disclose information different from other sectors 
(specifically, the energy, utilities and finance sectors). We use the same controls in all models 
(Good News, Size, Leverage, and Volatility) except for the Timeliness of Good and Bad News 
models, which exclude the Good News control.19
We expect the coefficient on CG Rank to have a positive sign in the document count models 
given the predicted positive association between CG and the frequency of disclosure. In all of 
the timeliness models (for prices and documents), CG Rank is expected to have a negative 
sign since better governed firms are predicted to be more timely when releasing information 
and to exhibit greater transparency.

18 See Beekes and Brown (2007) for further discussion of unfiltered versions of the good, bad and all news 
timeliness measures. 
19 We wish to keep our principal models relatively parsimonious to enable comparisons with the results of 
Beekes and Brown (2006). In sensitivity analysis we re-specify models to include measures of share ownership 
and growth, in order to explore alternative explanations for the principal results. 
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We fit the models using pooled OLS rather than adopting a firm fixed effects approach 
because the CG measures exhibit considerable inertia or ‘stickiness’ (Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2012; Black, Jang and Kim, 2006; Brown, Beekes and Verhoeven, 2011). 
Stickiness is manifest in our sample in that the variance in CG Rank between firms is 26.52, 
while the within-firm variance is 13.28. For CG Stars the variance between firms is 1.04 and 
the within-firm variance is 0.53 [details are not tabulated]. All models are estimated with 
standard errors clustered by firm to control for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation 
in the residuals. We address concerns regarding endogeneity in section 5.4.
5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
-Table 1- 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables over the whole period and 
their means before and after the ASX CG Code took effect. Firms’ CG is rated 3.5 stars on 
average (CG Stars). Some firms were assessed as having very poor CG (awarded 1 star) 
while others were considered exemplary (awarded 5 stars). Firms in the sample released 93 
documents per year on average during the eight year period (All Documents), although the 
standard deviation is 71 indicating some firms released considerably more documents than 
the average. About a third of all documents released are classified by the ASX, ex ante, as 
price sensitive (PS Documents).  
Recall that smaller values of timeliness indicate more timely outcomes. The timeliness of all 
(price sensitive) documents ranges between 0.16 (0.13) and 0.77 (0.90), with a mean of 0.46 
(0.51). The BB06 timeliness metrics, Timeliness (Timeliness deflated) of prices, range 
between 0.04 (0.03) and 0.73 (0.38) with a mean of 0.20 (0.14), after winsorising. The 
timeliness of good news and the timeliness of bad news have similar distributions with both 
having sample means of 0.51.  
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Since the ASX CG Code was introduced there has been a statistically greater level of 
document disclosure, as reflected in the average number of documents released annually as 
well as the number of documents classified by the ASX as price sensitive, and more timely 
price discovery when the raw timeliness metric is used but no significant change for deflated 
timeliness, which partially controls for volatility. The timeliness of good and bad news has 
declined since the ASX CG Code took effect (the metrics are larger), but the timeliness of 
price sensitive documents has increased. Also the mean star rating of firms’ CG has risen.  
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by sector using Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) definitions. Some 24 per cent of observations are from the 
Materials sector, 19 per cent from Consumer Discretionary and 18 per cent from the 
Industrial sector. The remaining sectors (Consumer Staples, Energy, Financials, Healthcare, 
Information Technology, Telecommunication Services and Utilities) each comprise 10 per 
cent or less of the sample. CG star ratings are largest on average in the Financials sector. The 
mean number of documents shows considerable variation in the frequency of releases by 
industry, with the greatest number being in the energy sector.
Table 2 shows the product-moment correlations. The two CG variables, CG Rank and CG
Stars, are positively correlated by construction (ݎ ൌ ͲǤͻͶ͹). In general CG (whether 
measured by CG Rank or CG Stars) is positively correlated with the number of company 
announcements made via the ASX (Log Docs and Log PS Docs). CG is positively correlated 
with firm size and leverage, but negatively with volatility. On the whole the bivariate 
correlations indicate firms whose CG is rated more highly do make more frequent and more 





As discussed, we adopt Ball and Brown’s (1968) API methodology to show the relationship, 
at the portfolio level, between the speed of price discovery over the course of the year and the 
quality of the firm’s CG. To illustrate, if better governed firms are more forthcoming in their 
disclosures, then when graphed the API of the Best CG-All news portfolio should tend to be 
above the API of the Worst CG-All news portfolio.
Many comparisons are possible so we restrict our analysis to an annual timeliness statistic for 
five fundamental comparisons: (1) All news, Best vs. Worst CG; (2) Good news, Best vs. 
Worst CG; (3) Bad news, Best vs. Worst CG; (4) Good news vs. Bad news, Worst CG; and 
(5) Good news vs. Bad news, Best CG. The APIs for these five comparisons are presented in 
Figures 1 to 5. In the third and fourth comparisons the apparent differences are statistically 
reliable in that the size of the difference in the timeliness of the pair of portfolios in each 
figure is unlikely to have been observed by chance.20 In the case of the first, second and fifth 
comparisons, we do not rule out the possibility that the differences in the portfolios’ 
timeliness statistic are due to chance.  
- Figures 1 – 5 - 
It appears from this analysis that, prima facie, better governed firms are on the whole priced 
more efficiently (i.e., news is priced earlier) in equity markets than poorer governed firms 
(Figure 1), consistent with H2, although good news is priced more efficiently for poorer 
governed firms (Figure 2), consistent with H3. Correspondingly, bad news is priced more 
efficiently for better governed firms (Figure 3), consistent with H4. Consistent with H5 there 
is striking evidence that the timeliness of good news relative to bad is associated with CG: in 
Figure 4 the API for good news is everywhere above that for bad news for the worst 

20 We use a re-sampling procedure to decide whether the observed differences may be due to chance. The 
relative frequency (ݎ݂) with which resampling trials support each predicted difference in the portfolios’ 
timeliness statistic is as follows: (1) ݎ݂ ൐ ͲǤͺͳ (n.s.); (2) ݎ݂ ൐ ͲǤ͹ͷ (n.s.); (3) ݎ݂ ൐ ͲǤͻͻͺ; (4) ݎ݂ ൐ ͲǤͻͺʹ; (5) 
ݎ݂ ൐ ͲǤ͸ʹͺ (n.s.).  Further details on the procedure are in the appendix. 
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governed firms, other than in the immediate region of the end points which coincide by 
construction, whereas a completely different picture is apparent in Figure 5 for the better 
governed firms. For them, it appears that in the first few months of the year good news may 
be priced earlier than bad news, but over the last few months bad news is priced substantially 
earlier than good news – to the point where the timeliness metric averaged over the whole 
year indicates bad news is priced on average more efficiently.  
Bearing in mind that Australian listed companies must file a half-yearly as well as an annual 
report with the stock exchange, the behaviour of the APIs in Figures 3-5 in the region of 
event day -180 points to the half-yearly report being a significant market update, perhaps 
more so for bad news. We note that, for the sub-set of 1,340 cases where we could source the 
release date of the firm’s half-yearly report, the median number of days between the half-
yearly and yearly announcements was 182 days, while in more than 90% of the 1,340 cases 
the PFS was released between 173 and 202 days after an earlier half-yearly report 
(corresponding to days -187 and -216 in the graphs). The dotted vertical lines in Figures 1-5 
indicate the approximate Half-Yearly and PFS announcement periods, the latter being from 
three days before to three days after the reported release date in order to allow for the absence 
of trading in calendar time (due e.g. to public holidays or weekends). 
We conclude that, on the whole, the proposition that CG is associated with market 
transparency is supported, although even the best governed firms are not exactly even-handed 
in their disclosure of good and bad news. However, as strong as some of the results in this 
section appear to be, we have not yet controlled for other factors that, according to Table 2, 
are correlated with CG and may be driving some of these results. In the remaining sections 
we conduct more detailed tests that are designed to deal with this possibility. 
5.3. Multivariate analysis, primary results
22

The results in this section are from pooled OLS estimation with standard errors clustered by 
firm to control for heteroskedasticity and within-firm correlation in the residuals. All 
coefficients displayed in Tables 3 and 4 relate to variables that have been standardized to 
assist interpretation.21
5.3.1. Documents
First we examine the relationship between CG and document disclosures. We begin by 
replicating BB06 with our extended dataset (results are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 
3). Under H1, we would expect better CG to be associated with greater document disclosure 
(positive coefficient on CG). The results are consistent with this prediction. As mentioned in 
section 4.2.2 we expand the BB06 models, the results of which are reported in columns 3 to 6 
of Table 3. To assess the impact of additional explanatory variables, we report nested F-tests 
from regressions which sequentially add blocks of variables to the regression model (shown 
at the bottom of Table 3). The base case (Block 1) includes CG Rank, Good News, Size,
Volatility, Leverage and industry controls. Block 2 includes variables relating to the ASX CG 
Code (ASX and ASX·CG Rank), and Block 3 includes variables relating to CLERP (CLERP
and CLERP·CG Rank). Inclusion of the additional variables relating to the ASX CG Code is 
statistically significant in both document count models (columns 3 and 4) and in the 
timeliness of price sensitive documents model (column 6), but the variables relating to 
CLERP 9 are significant only in the timeliness of price sensitive documents model. 
-Table 3- 
Table 3 shows firms with better CG are associated with a greater number of disclosure 
documents (i.e. CG Rank has a positive coefficient in columns 3 and 4) prior to the ASX CG 

21 The standardization procedure is as follows. Continuous variables are transformed by subtracting the mean 
and dividing by the standard deviation; and indicator variables are transformed by subtracting the mean. For 
interacted terms, we subtract the mean of the variable created by the interaction of the indicator variable and the 
standardized continuous variable. The transformations are based on the means and standard deviations of the 
cases used to fit the particular model. 
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changes, which is consistent with results reported by BB06. Following the ASX CG changes, 
all firms tended to release more documents than in prior years (ASX coefficient = 0.376 in the 
all documents model and 0.753 in the price sensitive documents model). However, the 
increase was greater among poorer governed firms (the coefficient on the interaction between 
ASX and CG Rank is -0.111 for all documents and -0.093 for PS documents), which indicates 
a levelling in disclosure practices across firms following the emphasis on greater 
transparency in the ASX CG Code. The passage of CLERP 9 was followed by little change in 
the frequency of all document disclosures across the whole range of CG, whereas there is 
some evidence that the number of price sensitive disclosures declined marginally among 
better governed firms.22
We find no significant effect of CG on the timeliness of all or ex ante price sensitive 
documents prior to the ASX CG changes (columns 5 and 6). However, we note a weak effect 
showing tardier disclosures of price sensitive documents lodged by better governed firms 
after the ASX CG Code took effect (ASX·CG Rank is positive and significant), which is 
inconsistent with H6. We also find CLERP 9 was followed by more timely releases of price 
sensitive documents by firms regardless of their governance ranking. 
In summary, although better governed firms released more documents to the ASX prior to the 
ASX CG Code, their disclosures were not significantly more timely. Following the ASX CG 
Code, the average firm released more documents overall as well as more price sensitive 
documents. There is evidence that better governed firms released marginally fewer 
documents (both in terms of the number of price sensitive documents as well as all 
documents) and there is some evidence that better governed firms took longer to release price 

22 The coefficient on the interaction between CLERP and CG Rank of -0.033 in column 4 implies that a firm 
with a CG Rank two standard deviations above the sample mean is predicted to release one fewer price sensitive 
document annually since the passage of CLERP 9. This prediction is calculated as exp(-0.033*2*0.849), where 
exp() is the exponential function and 0.849 is the standard deviation of the log of the number of ex ante price 
sensitive documents (see Table 1). 
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sensitive information relative to earlier years. It also appears that firms have been releasing 
price sensitive documents sooner since the passage of CLERP 9. 
5.3.2. Timeliness of prices 
Under H2 we would expect to find faster price discovery for better governed firms (a 
negative coefficient on CG). Replicating the results in BB06 yields estimates consistent with 
this prediction (columns 1 and 2 of Table 4). The results from our expanded BB06 models are 
reported in columns 3 and 4 and additional dependent variables to examine the timeliness of 
good, bad and all news are reported in columns 5, 6 and 7. The nested F-tests reported at the 
bottom of Table 4 show the ASX and CLERP 9 variables are significant in the timeliness of 
good, bad and all news models, but not in the expanded BB06 models. 
-Table 4- 
Our expanded BB06 models (columns 3 and 4) yield no statistically significant relationship 
between CG and timeliness or timeliness deflated either before or after the ASX CG changes 
or CLERP 9, which is inconsistent with H2 and the reduced forms in BB06 (see the results in 
columns 1 and 2). This result may be due to bias in the BB06 timeliness measures caused by 
individual stock volatility, a finding echoing some earlier work on the effect of corporate 
disclosure and transparency on price and return behaviour. Bushee and Noe (2000) for 
example report high levels of disclosure attract transient institutional investors who trade 
aggressively on short-term earnings news, thus increasing return volatility. Botosan and 
Plumlee (2002) find more timely disclosure from quarterly reports is positively related to the 
cost of equity capital, which on the surface seems counter-intuitive. They attribute the 
relationship to short-termism among investors resulting in greater volatility of share prices 
being associated with more frequent disclosures. Given the half-yearly reporting requirement 
in Australia and the mid-year updates in price observed in Figures 1-5, we are not able to rule 
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out the possibility that opportunistic investing adds to volatility and confounds the 
relationship between CG and the BB06 measures of the timeliness of price discovery.
The timeliness measures in columns 5, 6 and 7 do not suffer from the same volatility-induced 
bias and should yield more reliable estimates. For the period before the ASX CG Code, firms 
with better CG appear to be more timely in the recognition of all news (negative coefficient 
on CG Rank in column 5). The positive coefficient on the interaction between good news and 
CG suggests better governed firms place less emphasis on the early release of good news 
(column 5), consistent with H3. Good news (column 6) is less timely following the ASX CG 
Code for weaker governed firms (coefficient on ASX = 0.218) and the more so for better 
governed firms (coefficient on ASX·CG Rank = 0.152). Relative to weaker governed firms, 
better governed firms are less timely when there is good news (the sum of the coefficients on 
CG Rank and ASX·CG Rank is 0.062), consistent with H3. This result again indicates a more 
balanced approach to good news recognition since the code was introduced. Although the 
timeliness of bad news (column 7) is improved for weaker governed firms after the ASX CG 
Code (coefficient on ASX = -0.323), we find no reliable evidence of an incremental effect of 
better CG on the timeliness of bad news, which is inconsistent with H4 and the API analysis. 
It may be evidence of an inherently conservative tendency of all firms to get bad news out to 
the market on a timely basis, as suggested by Skinner (1994). Curiously, CLERP 9 has been 
followed by less efficient pricing of all news, whether good or bad and independently of the 
firm’s governance rating (the coefficient on CLERP is significantly positive in columns 5, 6 
and 7 but its interaction with CG Rank is smaller in size and not statistically significant). 
In summary, better governed firms experience more timely price discovery and they are more 
balanced in recognition of good and bad news. After the ASX CG Code, the timeliness of 
good news has slowed relative to that of bad news for firms of all CG ‘types’, while better 
governed firms may have become more cautious in recognising good news. Furthermore, in 
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that period the timeliness of bad news appears not to have been related to differences in CG. 
Since the passage of CLERP 9, the average firm has been taking a more cautious approach to 
news recognition, which on balance has led to slower integration of news into prices. 
Interestingly, we find no significant incremental effect of CLERP 9 for better governed firms.  
5.4. Robustness 
Our results are robust to a range of alternative specifications and variable definitions. They 
include: (i) winsorising all continuous variables at the top and bottom 2.5 per cent of the 
distribution, to limit the influence of outliers; (ii) using the natural log of total assets as an 
alternative measure of Size; (iii) using CG Stars instead of CG Rank; (iv) excluding the 
energy sector (ܰ ൌ ͳͷͲ); (v) excluding the financials and utilities sectors (ܰ ൌ ͸ͺ and 
ܰ ൌ ͵ͺrespectively); (vi) including the percentage shareholding of the largest 20 
shareholders, sourced from Aspect Financial;23 (vii) including growth opportunities, proxied 
by the market value of shareholders’ equity divided by its book value;24 (viii) using the raw 
document count for total documents and ex ante price sensitive documents and fitting the 
document count models by Poisson methods; and (ix) excluding cases for 2008, to preclude 
the possibility that data from the global financial crisis period drive our results.
We also use a measure of ‘abnormal’ documents, calculated as the number of documents a 
firm releases during the year less the mean number of documents released by companies with 
the same GICS code as the firm in that particular year. Results confirm that, prior to the ASX 
CG Code, CG was positively associated with document disclosure frequency (price sensitive 

23 Greater ownership by the largest 20 shareholders may result in a lower perceived need to disclose 
information. We find firms with more concentrated ownership issue fewer documents (all and price sensitive), 
but experience more timely price discovery (timeliness and timeliness deflated). This variable is not significant 
in any other model. 
24 We include Growth to capture firms’ desire to retain information for proprietary reasons. The coefficient on 
Growth is negative and statistically significant in the document count models, consistent with the view that 
firms with high growth prospects release less information. Growth is negative in the timeliness of good news, 
but positive in the timeliness of bad news models, suggesting good news about firms with more growth 
opportunities is priced earlier but bad news is not. Growth is not significant in other models. 
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and all documents). However, the interaction terms between CG Rank and ASX and CLERP
are insignificant.  
To examine the potential influence of endogeneity in CG, we explored the use of 
instrumental variables (IV) estimation. Implementation of IV is far from straight forward as it 
requires the selection of instrumental variables that are both highly correlated with the 
variable for which they are instruments while at the same time being uncorrelated with the 
error (Kennedy, 2003, p.159; Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). We investigated the effect of 
using the average industrial sector level of CG and the average year level of CG (the current 
firm is excluded from the calculation of both instruments), and interactions of these variables 
with ASX·CG Rank and CLERP·CG Rank as instruments; however, the Hansen test indicates 
these instruments are not robust and yield unreliable IV results. When the instruments are not 
robust, Larcker and Rusticus (2010; 187) argue “it is likely that IV estimates are more biased 
and more likely to provide the wrong statistical inference than simple OLS estimates that 
make no correction for endogeneity.” For this reason we rely principally on pooled OLS 
results.25
6. Conclusions 
We re-examine the link between CG and disclosure frequency, the timeliness of disclosures, 
and the timeliness of information discovery reflected in share prices for a sample of 
Australian listed firms with financial years ending between 1 January 2001 and 31 December 
2008. In preliminary analysis, we use the Ball and Brown (1968) API methodology to graph 
the relationship, at the portfolio level, between the speed of price discovery over the course of 
a year and the quality of the firm’s CG. We tentatively conclude from this analysis that better 

25We did investigate the sensitivity of our results to the time period of CG in another attempt to address this 
issue, using OLS methods. Rather than estimating the models with contemporaneous disclosure proxies and CG 
plus control variables as in Tables 3 and 4, we used the next period’s values of the dependent variables (i.e. year 
t+1) and the current period’s CG and control variables (i.e. year t). The results were comparable with those 




governed firms are on the whole priced more efficiently (i.e., news is priced earlier) in equity 
markets than poorer governed firms, although good news is priced earlier for poorer governed 
firms. Correspondingly, bad news is priced earlier for better governed firms.  
We then take advantage of additional data now available to shed new light on the results 
reported by Beekes and Brown (2006). By exploiting a time series of governance data 
collected in a consistent fashion over an extended time period, we find the introduction of the 
ASX CG Code was accompanied by increased disclosure for all firms, together with 
increased timeliness in the share market pricing of bad news relative to good news, 
suggesting a levelling of practice as firms with weaker CG became more transparent. Since 
CLERP 9 firms appear to have become more cautious in their disclosure policies and there 
has been a reduction in the timeliness with which both good and bad news are priced. Our 
results also indicate legislative change has brought about a more level playing field for 
corporate disclosures. However, while it is now more difficult for better governed firms to 
distinguish themselves through their disclosure policies, there may still be enough room for 
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Appendix: A resampling test of the statistical reliability of the difference in the mean 
timeliness calculated for two ‘portfolios’ 
It is one thing to observe a difference in a summary statistic, in the present case ‘timeliness’, 
for two portfolios, but another to decide whether the observed difference may be due to 
chance. We calculate this possibility by applying a simple resampling procedure.  
Consider two portfolios, ܲͳ and ܲʹ, comprising ܰͳand ܰʹsecurities respectively. Their 
combined portfolio comprises ܰ ൌ ܰͳ ൅ ܰʹ securities. We operationalise a portfolio’s 
timeliness as the average difference between the portfolio’s cumulative, market-adjusted 
price relative and its terminal value (of one) calculated over the 365 days from day -365 to 
day -1. (Note that the timeliness metric used here differs slightly from that used in tests at the 
level of the individual stock.) Next, calculate the statistic for ܲͳand for ܲʹ, and the 
difference observed between the two statistics; call this difference the experimental value 
(ev). The resampling procedure is designed to generate the distribution of ev if the allocation 
of the sample of firm-years to each portfolio were the result of chance. To generate this 
distribution, we conduct a sufficiently large number of trials. In the first trial, we randomly 
assign ܰͳ of the ܰ cases to the first pseudo portfolio, pseudo ܲͳ, and assign all of the 
remaining cases (there are ܰʹ ൌ ܰ െ ܰͳ) to pseudo ܲʹ. We then calculate the difference in 
the statistic for pseudo ܲͳ and for pseudo ܲʹ, which we call the control value (cv), and note 
whether cv is less than, equal to, or greater than ev. We conduct this resampling procedure 
100,000 times. At the end of the resampling process we calculate the relative frequencies 
with which the three outcomes (cv<ev, cv=ev, cv>ev) occurred, and apply a one- or two-
tailed test as appropriate. 

